
Cyber Resilience Act Compliance for Manufacturers Selling into the EU
CRA reporting obligations have applied since 11 September 2026. Full application follows on 11 December 2027.
Since 11 September 2026, every manufacturer selling products with digital elements in the EU has to report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents: an early warning within 24 hours, a notification within 72 hours. That applies to a machine builder in Stuttgart and to a device maker in Ohio or Shenzhen alike. By 11 December 2027 the rest of the regulation follows: secure development, a software bill of materials, vulnerability handling across the whole support period, technical documentation and the CE marking. Most of that is engineering work in your build pipeline, not paperwork. That is the part krafteq builds.
We ran the CRA self-assessment on our own products first: SBOM generation (CycloneDX 1.6), vulnerability scanning and a gap analysis against Annex I and II.
Who is affectedDoes the CRA apply to you?
The regulation follows the product, not the company's address. If a product with digital elements is placed on the EU market, the CRA applies to it: hardware with firmware, connected devices, embedded controllers, desktop and mobile software sold as a product.
-
Manufacturers inside the EU
You design or build the product, or have it built, and sell it under your own name or trademark. You carry the full set of obligations: risk assessment, secure development, SBOM, vulnerability handling, reporting, documentation and the CE marking.
-
Manufacturers outside the EU
The same obligations apply as soon as your product is sold in the EU. You can appoint an authorised representative established in the EU, but the engineering evidence still has to come from your own development process.
-
Importers and distributors
Importers have to check that the manufacturer met its obligations before a product goes on the market. In practice they pass that pressure on: they ask their suppliers for the SBOM, the support period and a contact for vulnerability reports.
-
Suppliers of components
If your firmware, library or module ends up inside someone else's product, your customer needs your vulnerability information to meet their own obligations. Expect CRA questions in purchasing and supplier audits even before your own product falls under the regulation.
TimelineWhat applies when
The CRA entered into force on 10 December 2024 and applies in stages. Two dates matter most for manufacturers: reporting has already started, and the full set of requirements follows fifteen months later.
-
10 December 2024: entry into force
Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 was published and entered into force. From here, the transition periods run.
The clock started
-
11 June 2026: conformity assessment bodies
The rules for notifying conformity assessment bodies apply. This is what makes third-party assessment possible for important and critical products.
Third-party assessment becomes available
-
11 September 2026: reporting obligations
Actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents have to be reported to your national CSIRT and ENISA through the Single Reporting Platform. An early warning within 24 hours, a notification within 72 hours, a final report within 14 days of a fix being available for a vulnerability, or within one month for a severe incident. This applies to products already on the market.
In force now
-
11 December 2027: full application
Every essential requirement of Annex I applies to products placed on the market: secure by design and by default, vulnerability handling, SBOM, technical documentation, conformity assessment and the CE marking.
Everything has to be in place
What it means in practiceWhere manufacturers usually get stuck
The legal text is the easy part to read. The hard part is that most requirements only hold up if they are produced automatically, with every release, by the pipeline that builds the product.
-
24 hours is not enough time to find out who to call
An early warning within 24 hours only works if the path is set up in advance: who decides that a vulnerability is actively exploited, who submits the report, who signs it off, and what goes into it. Without that, the first real incident becomes the rehearsal.
-
An SBOM that is out of date the day after release
Annex I asks for a software bill of materials in a commonly used, machine-readable format, covering at least the top-level dependencies. A one-off spreadsheet does not survive the next release. It has to be generated with every build and stored with the release it belongs to.
-
Vulnerability handling for the whole support period
The support period is, as a rule, at least five years. That means scanning, triage and security updates for versions that are already in the field, not only for the one under development.
-
Evidence scattered across tools
The technical documentation has to show how the product was designed, built and tested for security. When the evidence lives in tickets, chat threads and people's heads, putting it together for an assessment takes weeks.
-
Nobody owns the topic internally
Legal owns the regulation, engineering owns the pipeline, product management owns the support period. The CRA needs all three at once, and in many companies that seat is empty.
Our ApproachBuild the evidence into the pipeline
We are a technical implementation partner. We build the controls the CRA asks for into your existing CI/CD setup, so that every release produces its own evidence: an SBOM, a scan result, a record of which vulnerabilities were accepted or fixed and why.
Reporting as a prepared workflow: templates for the 24-hour, 72-hour and final reports, a clear decision path for what counts as actively exploited, named people and approvals. Written down, tested and handed to the team that will use it.
Your team keeps it running. We work alongside your engineers, document every step and hand over runbooks. If you prefer, we take over ongoing monitoring and SBOM updates as a service instead.
What we do not do: legal advice or certification. We work with your legal counsel and, where your product needs one, with a notified body. They make the legal and formal calls, and we supply the technical evidence.
ProcessFour steps from assessment to handover
Each step ends with a result you can use on its own. You can stop after any of them.
-
CRA technical assessment (2 to 3 days)
Gap analysis of your development process, pipeline and dependency management against Annex I. We determine the product category (default, important class I or II, critical) and the support period you can realistically commit to. You receive a prioritised roadmap.
Your scope, your category and a plan in writing
-
SBOM and vulnerability handling (week 1 to 2)
SBOM generation in CycloneDX or SPDX as a pipeline step, versioned per release. Scanning of dependencies, containers and code. Risk-based triage with target fix times, for example critical within 24 hours, high within 7 days, medium within 30 days.
An SBOM and a scan record for every release
-
Reporting workflow and secure development (week 2 to 4)
The 24h, 72h and final report workflow for the ENISA Single Reporting Platform. A coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy with security.txt and a triage process. Security gates in the pipeline: static and dynamic analysis, secrets detection. Technical documentation generated from pipeline artefacts where possible.
Ready to report, with a development process you can show
-
Handover or ongoing service (week 3 to 4)
Your team takes over with documented processes, runbooks and a handover workshop. Or krafteq keeps running monitoring and SBOM updates for you.
CRA work that keeps running after we leave
ServicesWhat we implement
Each item maps to a concrete CRA requirement. We start with what your assessment shows is missing, not with the full list.
SBOM generation
CycloneDX or SPDX, generated automatically in the pipeline and stored with each release. Covers at least the top-level dependencies, as Annex I requires, and usually far more.
Vulnerability handling
Automated scanning of dependencies, containers and code. Prioritisation by severity, exploitability and whether the vulnerable code is actually reachable. Target fix times per severity.
Reporting workflow
Decision path, templates and approvals for the early warning, the notification and the final report to the ENISA Single Reporting Platform.
Secure development lifecycle
Security gates in the pipeline: static and dynamic analysis, secrets detection, secure default configuration. A documented cybersecurity risk assessment for the product.
Coordinated vulnerability disclosure
A disclosure policy, security.txt, an intake channel for external reports, a triage workflow and published security advisories.
Technical documentation
The documentation required by Annex VII, assembled from pipeline artefacts and version history wherever possible, so it stays current with the product.
Cyber Resilience Act Compliance for Manufacturers Selling into the EU — let's tackle it
Let us discuss how we can solve this challenge for your organization.
“Most CRA requirements come down to one question: can you show, for any version in the field, what is inside it and what you did about its vulnerabilities? If the pipeline answers that with every release, the rest is paperwork.”